One challenge in writing Our
War or any other Civil War history is to suspend knowledge of what came
next. If you’re going to stay in the moment and keep your characters there, you
can’t tell the story with the outcome in mind. As I read Allen Guelzo’s account
of the July 2, 1863, fighting in his new Gettysburg:
The Last Invasion, I was thus curious about where, in Guelzo’s view, things
would stand when the day ended.
Pvt. Martin Haynes of the 2nd New Hampshire |
I try to show through their experiences how the fates of their
regiments intertwined. All three regiments fought on the Union left, Haynes’s
2nd New Hampshire and Musgrove’s 12th in Dan Sickles’s 3rd Corps, Cross’s 5th with
the rest of his brigade in Winfield Scott Hancock’s 2nd Corps.
Sgt. Richard Musgrove |
Haynes and Musgrove were keen observers of the fighting and
its aftermath; Cross, as a beloved commander, was keenly observed. I loved
weaving their stories together.
Col. Edward E, Cross |
Let us take a look at how Guelzo dealt with this moment in Gettysburg: The Last Invasion.
Historians sometimes use a quotation from Maj. Gen. George
Meade, the Union commander at Gettysburg, to indicate that from his perspective
all was well that night. The quotation is this: “Yes, but it is all right now,
it is all right now.”
Guelzo puts this comment in its proper context. Meade made
it not at the end of the day’s fighting but earlier, as an expression of his relief
that reinforcements had arrived just in time to plug a breach in the Union line
– one of many close calls that day. I should add that while giving Joshua
Lawrence Chamberlain and the 20th Maine their due, Guelzo praises many similar brave
and fortuitous moments that day. He points out that after the war Chamberlain
had the time, motive and skill to burnish his regiment’s deeds and his
reputation.
Later, Guelzo makes a stronger case than most historians
have that Meade wanted to pull back after the July 2 fighting rather than
remain and fight on July 3. Firm, near-unanimous advice from his subordinate
generals convinced him that he had to stay. The point is, at the end of the
second day, Meade was not confident he had won a thing.
And how could he have been? In assessing Army of the Potomac casualties, Guelzo looks closely at the record. Thomas L. Livermore, a 5th New Hampshire man who served as head of the 2nd Corps ambulance corps at Gettysburg, did a careful study of Union casualty numbers after the war. He counted 3,903 dead, 18,735 wounded and 5,425 missing at Gettysburg for a total of 28,063. Meade told a congressional committee there were more than 20,000 casualties on the second day alone.
And how could he have been? In assessing Army of the Potomac casualties, Guelzo looks closely at the record. Thomas L. Livermore, a 5th New Hampshire man who served as head of the 2nd Corps ambulance corps at Gettysburg, did a careful study of Union casualty numbers after the war. He counted 3,903 dead, 18,735 wounded and 5,425 missing at Gettysburg for a total of 28,063. Meade told a congressional committee there were more than 20,000 casualties on the second day alone.
Here is how Guelzo sums up the situation after the last shot was fired on July 2:
“The Army of Northern Virginia had dealt its Union
counterpart a series of blows which, purely in terms of casualties and human
destruction, had the unhappy Army of the Potomac as thoroughly on the ropes as
it had ever been. The 1st Corps and the 11th Corps had been crushed down to the
nubs on July 1st; on July 2nd, the 3rd Corps and the 5th Corps, along with an
entire division of the 2nd Corps, had been ground into oblivion. By moonrise on July 2nd, George Meade had
only the 12th Corps and the 6th Corps in any sort of fighting shape, along with
four brigades of Hancock’s 2nd Corps. . . .
“It must have occurred to George Meade that perhaps the
stand at Gettysburg had been a big mistake, after all.”
My three soldiers in Our
War would have agreed. They all served in units that Guelzo
rightly describes as “ground into oblivion.”
Like practically all our readers, both Guelzo and I know
what happened on July 3, but the men we wrote about, from Private Haynes in my
case to General Meade in his, did not. Although Pickett’s Charge decided the
battle and proved to be a turning point in the war, the outcome was very much
in doubt when the Union generals gathered at Meade’s headquarters late the
night of July 2.
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